Indonesia, then called the Dutch East Indies, was in turmoil. Following the Japanese surrender there was no effective government and a full scale insurrection was in progress against the resumption of Dutch rule. The Nationalist Army which had been trained by the Japanese but which was now under the effective control of its leader, Sukarno, numbered some 120,000 men. In Sourabaya alone there were 12,000 armed men.
49 Indian Infantry Brigade, which had only recently landed at Sourabaya, had lost 18 officers and 374 soldiers in bitter fighting while attempting to restore order. Many civilians, Dutch, Chinese and others, had been massacred.
By the end of October and early November, all hell was breaking out in Java, and the Berks Yeo was given two days to pack and leave for Singapore, where we were to embark for Sourabaya.
Java is the largest island of the Indonesian Archipelago, and in 1945 had a population of some 50 million people. It is immensely rich[in natural resources], and its development has been influenced by European countries, Portugal, Holland and Britain since the 16th century, with the Dutch taking charge for most of the 17th to 20th century.
A very strong nationalist movement existed from the early 1900’s and in 1927 Dr Sukarno, together with Drs Hatta and Sjahrir formed the PNI (Partai National Indonesia). They were all three arrested in 1930, and kept in prison until freed by the Japs in 1942. Throughout the war, the Japanese though ruling with the same brutality as elsewhere, encouraged the Nationalist movement, and hatred of the Dutch, while building up a very large army, estimated at 120,000, based upon the original armed forces trained pre-war by the Dutch.
Just before the Japs surrendered, these three leaders were granted independence, and on 17th August 1945 they issued a proclamation, announcing Indonesia was a republic, with Soekarno as President, Hatta as Vice President, and Sjahrir as Prime Minister. Not everyone was delighted, as there were some 'war lords' established in other districts, especially in East Java who had ambitions for themselves. They were united in hatred of the Dutch, and split on just about every other issue. This made it difficult for incoming forces after the war, to find a fully responsible leader with whom they could negotiate.
On the Allied side, represented by the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), under Mountbatten, no plans had yet been drawn up for Java, which would have followed on from recovery and consolidation in Malaya. The Japanese surrender however left a vacuum, and aggravated the problem of many thousands of allied personnel and women internees still confined and starving under atrocious conditions in Java, and now even worse than when the Japs were in control. Mountbatten cobbled together a force to enter Java from units in India, Burma and Malaya, and troops were flown in with instructions to rescue internees, disarm the Japs, maintain order and protect the essential services such as communication, water and power. To this end these troops were spread very thin on the ground, and in Sourabaya at least, units as few as ten to fifteen men were isolated at various key points.
There was no stated intention to interfere with politics, but the Indonesians, perhaps reasonably, feared that the British and Indian troops were merely an advance guard for the return of the hated Dutch. Negotiations continued, with many genuine and some deliberate misunderstandings, and eventually early in November the Indonesians attacked, ambushing and killing hundreds of our troops, including Brigadier Mallaby, who was murdered on his way to a meeting with the Senior Indonesian Political Officer in East Java.
One story which arose at this time was of a small British force in central Java who had parachuted in and disarmed the Japs, but when the officer in charge saw the forces ranged against him, realised he could not cope with his few men, so he re-armed the Japs and sent them out to restore order. They were back in no time, reporting all was under control. 'That was quick', said the British Officer, 'how did you manage it ' No Problem' said the Jap, 'we just cut off six heads in the front row, and the rest dispersed to their homes'!
In Sourabaya after the most fearful battle and losses, the prison built pre-war by the Dutch, for 1200 prisoners, was stormed and taken by the Indian troops, and 3000 RAPWI (Released Allied Personal and Women Internees) were found. The Indonesians had already poured petrol on the roof with the intention of holding them as hostages, or burning and killing them all.
The Regiment under command Lt Col RLT Burgess, later awarded the DSO for his leadership in this operation, was dispatched in support of 5 Indian Division to Java sailing from Singapore on 1st December 1945.
We proceeded down to Singapore and by the Queen Emma into the Southern Hemisphere and Sourabaya where we arrived on 3rd December 1945. Then the fun started. There was no welcoming populace lining the beach to greet their gallant liberators, this was no New Delhi, instead we were seen as the advance party of the Dutch colonial masters coming to re-colonise them. And having been handed their independence by the Japanese, the populace did not intend to revert to the old colonial system. Bill Templeton

About 200 of us were crammed on Queen Emma, which was a Royal Yacht, and we set off for Sourabaya almost as infantrymen. We had no guns, just our rifles and things. The job was to hang on to the Docks until the heavy stuff arrived and then move into the town. I remember us being shot at, as the boat was going down through the harbour. I think the best part of the Dutch fleet was sunk there; you could see these funnels and things sticking up in the water. Dick Salkeld
On 5th December within hours of their arrival at Sourabaya, 509 Battery were in action in support of a mobile infantry column successfully engaging a number of targets. Next day 395 Battery were also undertaking similar operations with another column.
By the time we arrived in Sourabaya on 4th December, the town was more or less cleared of regular enemy troops, but sniping continued, and one of my soldiers was shot while walking in the harbour area, fell into the water and was never seen again. I had landed at about midday on the 4th, and before 2 o’clock had the guns in action registering defensive targets for the 3/2 Punjabi battalion, who I was supporting at that time. They had their officers’ mess in the offices of the Heineken Brewery, where an estimated 999,000 gallons of beer from pre-war were stored. We had access, but conditions were too fraught for drinking, and we confined ourselves to half a pint maximum at lunch, and perhaps if one was off duty, again in the evening!
Our first major operation was a three day excursion to a town 23 miles to the south of Sourabaya, it was a very dodgy operation with casualties on both sides, and only partially successful, as we rescued a few hundred RAPWI only, while another thousand or so women and children were taken further into the interior, to be used as hostages in negotiations later. We had some difficult times in my forward observation role, including a night attack, which turned out to have been by Javanese women, we killed two, and were very disturbed when we found the bodies next day, only to be somewhat comforted by the sight of four hand grenades rolling out from their sarongs when we dragged them off the road. On another occasion I was nearly run down by the dead driver in a jeep we ambushed.
Gradually by energetic patrolling, we drove the Indos further back, and eventually we were able to move our forward positions out of town. By this time I was with a battalion of Dogras from the north of India. We would patrol all day, often making contact with the enemy and after a quick interchange, retire to our camp.
There in the evening I often joined them in playing volley ball, when by my white skin and extra height I must have stood out very clearly. One evening there was the crack bang of a snipers bullet, and a man just behind me and a little to my right, dropped dead, hit in the back. I felt dreadful, as the shot had obviously been meant for me, but the sniper had 'pulled' the trigger rather than squeeze it, and the resulting deflection had saved my life and cost him his.
Next day we went out on patrol with the intention of hitting them hard, and when we came to the point of contact, I was about to take cover, when I saw that the Dogra Officer was standing alongside me, trying to identify the point from which enemy fire came. The two of us stood there peering through our binoculars, and every now and then he would stop and call to one of his soldiers to keep his head down! Not to be outdone, I turned to my radio operator and OPA (Observation Post Assistant), who was crouching a little behind me on the left, and told him to get down behind a large milestone a few yards away. 'as we did not want the radio damaged'.
It was a ludicrous situation with the two officers standing up on a bund in full view of the enemy, and telling their soldiers to keep their heads down in case they got shot! No sooner had Baker, my OPA, moved to the safer position than some more shots came over and one bullet passed close on my left, (another case of 'pull' not squeeze?) went through the point where he had been crouching and ricocheted off the milestone about eighteen inches in front of his face 'wheeeeee' into the distance.
This second volley enabled us to identify the location of the enemy, and after I had dropped a few shells in the area, we continued our advance unmolested. We reached the enemy village which had been evacuated, found a number of interesting items and took one prisoner who we found hiding under water in a stagnant pool, and trying to breathe through a hollow reed. When we pulled him out, he was so terrified that his eyes appeared to be rotating independently, like a chameleon. A feat I have never seen repeated! When we got him back to base we were told that he gave a lot of useful information under interrogation. Paul Matthews

The 396 Battery Newsletter of 11 December 1945 (written by Richard Lewis and John Puxley) contained the following report:
Well, it has happened at last. On the afternoon of 4th December 1945, the 2286th day after the Regiment assembled on Newbury racecourse in 1939, the Berks Yeo went into action at Sourabaya in Java.
We were uprooted from a Utopian existence at Ipoh in Malaya 3 weeks ago, and moved down to Johore – 20 miles from Singapore waiting for a boat. We were only there a week and then came over to here to Java – a 48hr trip. We crossed the Equator at 0300hrs so there was no ceremony. Needless to say the main part of the Regiment arrived before the Advance Party which had started earlier. We went into action the day after we disembarked and have been firing away every day since.
Sourabaya is a very big town with a population of nearly half a million before the war. It is filthy dirty and badly knocked about at present and the streets full of broken furniture and glass. The worst thing is lack of water and light but people are very ingenious in devising methods of making themselves comfortable and we do not do so badly.
Before we got here the fighting to clear the town was quite heavy. The Indonesians suffered 7500 casualties which made them a lot less keen. They were thrown out of the town and we hold a semi-circle round it from the sea on one side to the sea on the other. The Indonesians have become a bit tired of being shelled and have withdrawn a little way to keep out of range. There is a wide belt of No-man’s land and we dominate this by sending out patrols of tanks infantry and guns. Our OPs have had some quite exciting times and the guns fired over open sights the last time they went out of perimeter.
Scarcely a day passed until early April without two out of the three batteries busy in action. Enemy tactics including sniping, blowing up bridges, laying mines and setting ambushes.
For some weeks thereafter we fought our way inland. It was essentially an anti-terrorist operation where you never turned you back on a farmer hoeing his rice paddy, since once past him he could readily open up with a hidden machine gun. I can recall one incident when patrolling with a Ghurkha platoon and Captain Ron Middleton and I received a call from our invaluable Air OP warning us of an ambush on the jungle trail several hundred yards ahead. While Captain Middleton and I and the Platoon Commander waited, the Ghurkhas melted into the jungle and returned ten minutes later grinning from ear-to-ear and assuring us that they had “taken care of the situation”. They were indeed wonderful soldiers. One slept comfortably in territory infested with bandits when the Ghurkhas were providing the security. Bill Templeton
Lt Col WH Skrine wrote of the following incidents in his History of the Berkshire Yeomanry:
On 10th January there had been much extremist activity on the north side of the perimeter at the village of Mengaute. D Troop guns supporting the Second Battalion of the 1st Punjab Regiment were in action early next morning from a position just west of the village. The Punjabis very soon made contact with a party of 25 Indonesians in Brinkang, not far away. They drove them out and found three dead bodies.
The CO of the Punjabis moved his tactical headquarters and two platoons forward to this place soon afterwards. Major Hugh Whitcombe (OC 396 Battery) was with him. This party waited near Brinkang, until forward patrols had cleared the kampongs which lay some distance away, to south, west, and north. The CO intended to move north, through Domas, as soon as this place was reported clear.
The leading patrol was first opposed by three medium machine guns firing from a large kampong 3,000 yards west of Brinkang. The patrol cleared this locality, captured one of the machine guns and from there proceeded to clear the settlements to the west and north-west of Domas. Small parties of enemy could be seen withdrawing northwards. as the Indians approached.
One of the two platoons at Brinkang now went forward to join the leading patrol in pursuit on the far side of Domas. There was no opposition in this village and the road now seemed to be clear for the remaining platoon and CO's party to follow by the direct road north from Brinkang. While this group was moving forward it was caught in a road block, cleverly concealed and covered by a medium machine gun and about thirty snipers. The extremists held their fire until this HQ party was at very close range. The Battalion commander, in the leading jeep, was killed outright
Major Whitcombe was in the second jeep. Hugh was wounded in the first burst of fire and died soon afterwards. The Battalion wireless sets were put out of action by small arms fire and this isolated column lost touch with the other groups. The platoon, under Subedar Karim Khan, took up a defensive position and beat back four attacks by the Indonesians - attacks that went on for an hour and a half. The Subedar was awarded a Military Cross for his gallantry in this action. Major Whitaker's signaller, Lance Bombardier Gerbaldi, did extremely well, he was wounded at the same time as the CO but stayed on his set until it was shot to pieces and he managed to get back a report of what was happening, together with a very accurate location, which enabled reinforcements to be sent. He was awarded the Military Medal.
In such close country, nearly every kampong by the roadside could be used for an ambush, and some losses from these were inevitable. It is sad to record that, on 18th January, when a Gurkha patrol was returning to harbour after reconnoitring Krijan with two tanks, a shot was fired at our OP party, killing Sergeant Painter and one of the Gurkhas. Painter was a popular and most efficient signals instructor and was greatly missed in 395 Battery.
For the next few months there followed a number of short sharp battles which saw the Regiment in action many times in support of amongst others 9th Indian Infantry Brigade, 23rd Indian Infantry Brigade and 9th Ghurka Rifles. The enemy were well armed and determined, but by April 1946 most of the opposition had been overcome.
Our time in Sourabaya was drawing to a close as the Dutch troops were taking over. One lot moved in to the Dogras area; they were 'trained' in America, called themselves Marines and considered themselves very tough. They wished to go out on patrol and asked for Artillery support. Our Colonel and Brigadier were rightly nervous of sending an OP party out with such raw troops, and so I was asked to accompany them, but I would be given a section of Dogras to act as my personal escort.
We followed one of the regular patrol routes the Dogras and I knew so well, and when we came to the usual point of contact, I warned the Colonel who was in charge of the 'Marines', that if he went further he would come under fire. He looked at me with utter disdain, and you could read his thoughts, 'cowardly Englander, we are the Royal Dutch Marines, and not afraid of a few stinking natives'. After we had gone a few yards, one of the Dogras sidled up, 'Sahib Dushman hai', he whispered, and pointed out where he had seen the enemy. I alerted the guns, gave them the target and told them to stand by.
Some hundred yards on, and bullets started to fly, about eight to ten shots from a range of two to three hundred yards. The Dutch dived to the ground, including the Colonel who finished up in the roadside ditch about two metres below my feet, with his arms over his head and ears. He looked up at me and said 'Gunner, we are under fire, give us cover'. 'Good gracious' I remember saying, not a very helpful remark, but I was truly astonished! Then I thought to ask him which part of the scenery he would like 'covered', but decided it was not my job to teach him his, and brought down fire on the area targeted some half an hour before on advice from the Dogras. No orders were given, but when the shells arrived, the Dutch were on their feet, including the Colonel, and legging it for home. The Dogras and I followed with rather more dignity. I wished that ditch had been full of water, so that the Colonel would have been soaked and muddy, instead of just dusty and dishevelled. Paul Matthews
Towards the end of April 1946 the Regiment handed over its guns to the Dutch military authorities and by May 1946 the Regiment had been disbanded and the majority of its members were en route back to the United Kingdom and demobilisation.
About two thirds of the Regiment were now demobilised, and the remaining third was formed into one Battery (395), and sent to Batavia to be attached to another Field Regiment (178 Fd Regt RA) who were also understrength until we arrived. I was promoted Major and took over as Battery Commander. We were placed in support of a Ghurkha Battalion to the North East of the town where there were still a large number of Indonesian soldiers and a very aggressive leader. As Battery commander I did not get out to the field as before, but we did have one battle which is best described in the words I used when writing to a friend in UK at that time. The letter was found recently in the bottom drawer of his desk when he moved house, and he returned it to me. "I was very lucky, as it was my last patrol (Group 44 will be leaving any day now) and my Company bumped into trouble. We were out in the open about 300 yards from cover and were pinned down by fire from 2 Light machine guns and 30 rifles. There were about 100 of the enemy in all, some armed with spears! We had great fun then with the battery firing on the wood, and the Indos who never dug in, were running out of the wood into the field to get away from the tree bursts. Once they left the wood, I had a glorious target, and the poor devils were so frightened they were rushing round in circles, some managed to escape, but Ron with another company was able to see them, so he took one of the gun troops, and kept the pot boiling. All in all it was a most satisfactory day, particularly as the Ghurkhas who we were supporting, suffered no casualties”. Paul Matthews

In Batavia, between April and August 1946, 395 Bty (with its troops renamed E and F Troop) were frequently in action and fired nearly 3000 rounds overall. The Bty was finally disbanded on 6 September 1946.
So ended our time in Java, but a few statistics taken from our regimental history of the year 1946, may serve to show that this unpublicised war was a vicious and bloody one, in which the objectives were achieved in spite of considerable political problems. The army lost 600 killed and 1400 wounded, RAPWI personnel suffered 1000 killed and 700 wounded or missing, Dutch forces lost 187 killed, and 500 wounded, while over 100,000 POWs and internees were rescued.
During the same period 700 Japanese soldiers died and a further 500 reported wounded or missing, and an estimated 5,800 Indonesians were killed and over 17,000 wounded.
When the British and Indian troops finally pulled out, they were spoken to by Dr Sjahrir, the Indonesian Prime Minister who said ' Although we are not yet in a position to be officially your hosts, it would be an odd thing indeed if the British and Indian armies should leave our country after this most important and eventful year of our history, unnoticed by us. Allow me to tell you what we think of you. Under all circumstances, even in unfriendly contact or in conflict with us, we learned to appreciate and admire you. You introduced to our country by your personal qualities some attractive traits of western culture our people have rarely seen before from white men they knew. I mean your politeness, your kindness, and your dignified self-restraint'.
One of his Ministers said privately at the same occasion, 'We know we need the white man’s advice, but anybody other than the Dutch. The finest thing for us, were it only possible, would be to join the British Commonwealth'. Not a bad epitaph for an army after a year of war! Paul Matthews

As with subsequent Indonesian campaigns this was extremely successful but little publicised. The Regiment provided essential artillery support throughout, firing a total of some 20,000 rounds and suffering a number of casualties including one officer and two men killed in action

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